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Abstract
This paper evaluates the effects of the Swedish aviation tax on the price and
demand for international air travel using the synthetic control group method. In
addition, it estimates the price elasticity of international air travel from Sweden using
web-scraped price data and an instrumental variable approach to account for the
simultaneity bias in the price and passenger demand relationship. The effects of the
tax are bigger than expected, with the effects on passengers increasing over time
after the introduction and the effects on the prices starting high and then decreasing.
The estimated price elasticity is -0.76, which together with the price effects of the
tax accounts for the reduction in international travel the first three quarters after
the introduction. The increase in passenger effects while the price effects diminishes
indicates that there in addition to the price effect of the tax is a symbol effect that are
affecting the behavior of the Swedish travelers. A potential “Greta Thunberg”-effect
is also considered, and no direct evidence for such an effect are found. In contrast to
other recent papers, no “leakage effect” of the tax, i.e. that passengers avoid the tax
by going to neighboring countries, is found.
1 Introduction
Emissions from air travel continue to increase globally, mainly due to a strong positive
trend in the number of passengers that travel by air. Sweden is one of the countries
that travels the most by air, per capita, in the world, and in an attempt to hamper the
continued increase in air travel demand the Swedish government introduced an aviation
tax in April 2018. The tax is a fixed tax per passenger and the level of the tax is distance
based, starting at around 6 Euros (60 SEK) for trips within Europe and ending at 40
Euros (400 SEK) for trips that are longer than 6000 km. The question is however, what is
the effect of the tax on the demand for air travel? And what is the effect on the price of air
travel? This paper tries to answer these questions through the use of a synthetic control
group method (SCM), where Sweden is used as the treatment group and other European
countries are used as potential donor countries for a synthetic control group. The effects on
outbound international passenger numbers and prices are estimated. To do this, quarterly
data from Eurostat on the number of passengers traveling internationally is used, together
with a quarterly price index. In addition to this, the price elasticity of international air
travels is estimated using web-scraped route level price data and an instrumental variable
(IV) estimation where a cost shifting variable based on route distance and jet fuel price is
used as an instrument for the price of air travel.
While several countries have introduced different types of air travel taxes, the economic
literature of its effects is relatively scarce. The estimated effects in the literature are also
somewhat conflicting. A few examples include Borbely (2019) and Falk and Hagsten
(2019) who analyze the German and Austrian aviation tax. Borbely (2019), who employs
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the synthetic control group method at airport level, find that the tax, which is of a very
similar size as the Swedish tax, reduces the total number of passengers from Germany with
2 percent, and that this effect can mostly be explained by the effect at low-cost carrier
dominated airports as well as a leakage of passengers to airports close to the German
border. Falk and Hagsten (2019) use a panel difference-in-difference approach to evaluate
the effect of the tax in both Germany and Austria. They find bigger effects than Borbely
(2019) as the effects they estimate are a reduction in international passengers by 9 percent
the first year and 5 percent the second year after the introduction of the tax. They also
find no evidence of passengers choosing airports in neighboring countries to avoid the tax,
but they do also find that the main driver of the effect is found at low cost-carrier airports.
Seetaram et al. (2014) uses an auto-regressive distributed lag model to estimate income,
price and tax elasticities of route level international travelers from the UK, and find humble
tax elasticities for most destinations, indicating a low effect of the tax on the number of
passengers. There are also papers who use a modeling approach to simulate the effects of
aviation taxes, using different price elasticities and assumptions of the price pass-through
of the tax and substitutbility between modes of travel and domestic and international
travel. Mayor and Tol (2007) do such an analysis where they evaluate different proposed
changes to the air passenger duty, and find in general small effects of the tax on both
passengers and emissions. Forsyth et al. (2014) is another example. They analyze the
Australian aviation tax using a simulation modeling approach, especially focusing on how
the tax affects the tourism industry in Australia, and finds that the industry will indeed
suffer, the severity of which will depend on the actual price elasticity of air travel.
In contrast, price elasticities of air travel is relatively well researched. And there is
good reason for this as price elasticities have been shown to vary a lot between e.g. source
markets, destinations, type of travelers (e.g. business and leisure travelers) and the type
of data as well as type of methodology that is used in the estimation (see e.g. Brons et al.
(2002) and Peng et al. (2015)). While there is some consensus in the level of average
price elasticities (in almost all cases the elasticity is negative, as expected), the width of
the estimates is large, ranging from small positive elasticities in some cases to being well
below a negative unit elasticity in other cases (Brons et al. (2002) show that elasticities
vary between 0.21 and -3.2 in their meta study). When looking at the European market
for international air travel however, the average elasticities are in most cases close to a
negative unit elasticity. Most papers in the field, especially the older papers, also assume
that price changes are exogenous, which given the pricing strategies of airlines is now
known not to be the case. Prices of a certain flight are changed depending on the demand,
which in itself depends on the price, and so forth. The dominating strategy to avoid this
endogeneity bias in the literature is to find a valid instrument that correlates with the
prices of air travel, but not with the choice to travel by the passengers. A recent example
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of this is Mumbower et al. (2014) who use web-scraped price and seating data to estimate
price elasticities in the US market, and how it varies depending on a number of factors,
while also addressing the aforementioned endogeneity problem using the air-lines prices in
all other markets than the market that they study, as well as the number of daily nonstop
flights that the competitor has, as instruments for the price. They find an average price
elasticity that varies between -1.32 and -1.97 depending on the price, but that the elasticity
also varies greatly on a number of other factors such as departure day of the week and
time of day that the ticket is booked. Hsiao and Hansen (2011) is another example and
they use the distance of the route times the price of jet fuel as an instrument, finding
elasticities between -1.05 and -2.97 depending on route and market. Given this variety in
estimates, it is important to estimate a trustworthy elasticity for the market that is being
considered. For Sweden, the available literature is scarce. To the best of my knowledge,
only one published paper exists, namely Kopsch (2012) who use aggregate price index
data in their estimations and find price elasticities between -0.67 and -0.85
This paper contributes to both the literature on the evaluation of aviation taxes, a
literature that still is rather sparse, as well as the literature on price elasticities air travel.
Given that the evidence from the existing literature on the effects of aviation taxes show
different effects, sometimes even contradicting effects, it is important to study the ef-
fects of these type of taxes further, not at least in other countries than has previously
been researched. To the best of my knowledge, no paper have been published where the
Swedish aviation tax has been evaluated. Sweden is also be an interesting case compared
to e.g. Germany and Austria, as the substitutes to international air travel, such as trains,
are not as available in Sweden compared to these countries. Understanding how effective
aviation taxes is to hamper the demand of air travel is especially important given how
emission-intensive air travel is, and as international air travel has been steadily increasing
up until the Covid-19 pandemic. The results are therefore useful for policy makers that
aim to reduce the emissions from the aviation sector. Similarly, as price elasticities differ
depending on source country, and as only one other paper have been published where
Swedish price elasticities are estimated, this paper adds to the literature on price elastic-
ities of international air travel as well. Just as for the evaluation of the tax, this is useful
for both policy makers and managers in the industry from both a Swedish and European
perspective. By using web-scraped price data on route level while simultaneously handling
the simultaneity bias in elasticity estimation we are also able to estimate a more detailed
elasticity than most papers in the literature that rely solely on aggregate data, and in
particular price indices instead of the actual offered price of a flight ticket.
The main findings in this paper are that the tax has a strong effect on the number of
international passengers from Sweden, an effect that seems to be increasing over time. The
effects are around 6 percent the first quarters and increasing to around 11 percent the last
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quarters in the time period studied (i.e. up until the start of the pandemic). The effects on
the price of air travel is surprisingly high, given the size of the tax, the first quarters after
the introduction of the tax (around a 10 percent increase), but then diminishes over time.
The estimated price elasticity of air travel is -0.76 percent, suggesting that the increase
in prices due to the tax can explain the drop in passengers in the first quarters after the
introduction of the tax. Since the passenger effect is increasing over time as the price
effect diminishes however, this indicates that there is also some sort of symbol effect of the
tax that potentially increased the environmental awareness of the prospective passengers.
While a potential ”Greta Thunberg”-effect, which could be a possible explanation for the
larger effect the second year, is investigated descriptively and no indication of a bias from
her environmental messages can be found, this could potentially still be an explanation
for the increased effect the second year after the tax. In the same manner, a relatively
stronger environmental awareness with respect to air travel in Sweden compared to the
control group countries could also be an explanation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the aviation tax is
described. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy that is employed in the paper and
section 4 describes the data that is used. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of
the paper, section 6 provides a robustness analysis of the results and section 7 concludes.
2 The aviation tax
The tax is a fixed tax per passenger where the level is based on the distance of the final
destination from Arlanda Airport. The tax is applied to all commercial flights, where the
airplane is registered for carrying 10 passengers or more, taking off from a Swedish airport
from April 1st 2018 and onward. All passengers on the flights are included except infants
(children younger than 2 years), transfer passengers from flights from outside of Sweden
that are made within 24 hours, and the cabin crew. The responsibility for paying the
tax is put on the airline, but the tax is usually communicated to the customers by the
airline in the price specification before the booking is made. The tax-levels are, with a
few exceptions, implemented as follows.
• Countries completely within Europe: 60 SEK / passenger (tax-zone 1)
• Countries completely or partially within another continent with a distance of at most
6000 km from Arlanda airport: 250 SEK / passenger. (tax-zone 2)
• Countries in a different continent than Europe with a distance of at least 6000 km:
400 SEK/passenger (tax-zone 3)
Some exceptions to this general rule exist as a result of a re-negotiation of the tax before
it was voted through the Riksdag on November 22nd, 2017. The detailed list of countries
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in the first and the second tax-zone respectively is found in 7, the countries in the third
tax zone are the remaining countries.
3 Econometric strategy
To estimate the effect of the tax on the number of international passengers and the price of
air travel, the synthetic control group method (SCM) developed by Abadie et al. (2010) and
Abadie et al. (2015) is used. The main purpose of the SCM is to estimate a counterfactual
outcome using a data driven approach that minimizes differences between the treatment
group, in this case Sweden, and a control group that is constructed through a weighted
average of countries that are similar to Sweden. By creating a control group that mimics
the development of international air passengers, or the price index of air travel, before the
tax is introduced in Sweden, counterfactual outcomes of international passengers and price
index are estimated that represent the levels in Sweden if no tax had been introduced. The
difference between Sweden and the synthetic control group after the tax thereby becomes
the estimated effect of interest, under the assumption that the synthetic control group
still successfully mimics the development in Sweden without the tax. Formally, following
the terminology of Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015), we have a sample of
J + 1 countries indexed by j, where unit j = 1 is Sweden (the country of interest) and
units j = 2 to j = J + 1 is the donor pool of potential control countries. There are
t = 1, ..., T time periods where time periods t, ..., T0 are the preintervention periods and
T0 + 1, ..., T are the postintervention periods. A synthetic control is represented by a
(J × 1) vector of weights W = (w2 + ... + wJ+1)′, with 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 for j = 2, ..., J and
w2, ..., wJ+1 = 1. The choice of a particular value of W is thereby a choice of a synthetic
control and the choice is made such that the characteristics of the synthetic control best
replicates the treated unit’s characteristics, where X1 is a (k× 1 vector of preintervention
characteristics for the treated unit and X0 is a (k×J) matrix of the same variables for all
the countries in the donor pool. The optimal synthetic control W ∗ is thereby selected in
order to minimize the difference between the preintervention characteristics of the treated
unit and the synthetic control, represented by the vector X1 −X0W . The variables that
have the largest predictive power on international passengers and price index, respectively,
are given the largest weights so as to best mimic the preintervention (and ultimately, the
counterfactual postintervention outcome) development of these variables in Sweden. The
estimated postintervention counterfactual outcome is thereby given by YCW
∗, where YC
is a matrix of the passengers or price index containing of the donor countries at a certain
postintervention time t (borrowing the notation from Borbely (2019)). Letting YT be the
outcome in the variable of interest in Sweden, international air passengers and the price
index of air travel respectively, the estimated effect of the tax thereby becomes YT−YCW ∗,
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for the time period after the implementation of the tax (t > T0).
The recommendation by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015) is to only
include countries in the donor pool where air travel as well as other predictors are not too
dissimilar to the unit of interest, i.e. Sweden. Due to this, only countries within the EU
are used as potential controls, and in addition, countries that have more than twice the
number of international passengers are excluded from the donor pool of potential controls.
In addition, countries that have had a similar treatment as Sweden during the time period
of consideration needs to be excluded, as one of the identifying assumptions in the SCM
is that the potential controls have not been exposed to a similar intervention as in the
country of interest. While several countries already had aviation taxes in the beginning
of the observed time period, only a few had taxes introduced or changed during the time
period of study, namely: Norway and the UK. UK is already excluded because of the size
of international air travel, but Norway is also excluded for this reason. Austria also has
a tax that is introduced in 2011, but as this is in the very beginning of the time series
considered (as is described in more detail in the next section), and we thereby only observe
the post-tax trends, it is left in the donor pool.
As international travel is highly seasonal, both the passenger and price index variable
is deasonalized before the SCM is used. This is done by estimating the average quarterly
effect using a linear regression where quarterly dummy variables are used to estimate the
average seasonal effect for the pre-treatment time. As the raw-data comparisons suggest
that there might be an anticipation effect the summer before the tax is introduced, the
desasonalization is based on the time period before the second quarter in 2017. The
estimated average quarterly effect is then removed for the whole time series. This is done
for all countries that are included, Sweden as well as all potential donor countries.
One drawback with the SCM compared to standard regression methods is that a con-
fidence interval cannot be easily estimated, and thus inference is not as straight forward.
To assess how likely it is that the estimated effects are due to a random fluctuation,
rather than being a true effect of the tax, placebo estimations are made for the whole
donor pool of potential control countries. The effect in Sweden is then compared to the
“effects” that are estimated for these countries, where we expect the Swedish effect to
be the most extreme (as no similar intervention has been made in the donor countries).
A p-value is calculated by comparing the “extremeness” of the Swedish effect to these
other countries, while at the same time adjusting for how well the pre-fit is made in these
placebo estimations (as a poor pre-fit by itself indicates that any observed “effect” after
the placebo-intervention time is less believable). This procedure yields what is called a
standardized p-value, and should be interpreted as the probability for the observed effect
to be a random event, after adjusting for the quality of the pre-fit in the placebo estima-
tions, i.e. in a very similar fashion as the commonly used p-value in standard regression
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methods. As the calculation of the p-value is, in essence, a comparison of “extremeness”
between the effects in Sweden and the placebo-effects in the donor pool, an adjusted p-
value of 0 is possible. This does however not mean that it is a zero chance of the effect to
be a random event, only that Sweden has the most extreme effect in comparison to the
donor pool in that specific post-tax time period.
To estimate the the price elasticity of international air travel, an instrumental variable
estimation is instead used. This is done in order to correct for the likely bias that stems
from the potential reverse causality in the relationship between air travel ticket pricing and
demand of air travel, i.e. that the price affects the demand for air travel at the same time
as the demand for air travel also affects how airlines price their tickets. In order for the IV-
estimation to solve this issue, the exclusion restriction must hold and the instrument must
be relevant. The exclusion restriction requires the instrument to have no correlation with
the dependent variable outside the correlation that goes through the explanatory variable
of interest, the variable that is instrumented. Ideally, one wishes the instrument to be
randomly assigned, but when observational data is used this is rarely the case. Instead
one needs to find a variable that likely fulfills the exclusion restriction anyway, and as
this is an untestable assumption the feasibility of this assumption must be examined by
reason. That the instrument is relevant means that the instrument must have a significant
effect on the variable that is instrumented, something which is easily tested in the first
stage estimation. When it comes to possible instruments that can be used for the price of
air travel, the literature proposes a few alternatives. Mumbower et al. (2014) provide a
comprehensive discussion of the most commonly used instruments, and divide them into
four different categories. One category of instruments is cost-shifting variables, a variable
that influences the cost per trip for the airline but that does not affect the passengers
decision to travel (outside the effect the variable has on the price). This variable is most
commonly used for estimations using aggregate data, and some examples in the literature
are Hsiao and Hansen (2011) who use the jet-fuel price times the route distance as an
instrument (which is also used in this paper), Berry and Jia (2010) and Granados et al.
(2012) who use a hub-indicator for the destination airports (as flights to hubs can be done
at a lower marginal cost due to the use of more fuel efficient air carriers) and Granados
et al. (2012) who use distance of the route as an instrument. Another category is referred
to as Hausman-type instruments, where the price of the same brand or product in other
markets are used as an instrument. An example being Gayle (2004) and Mumbower et al.
(2014) who use the average price in all other routes that have a similar length as the route
being studied. A third category is Stern-type instruments, where measures of competition
and market power are used as an instrument for the price. Berry and Jia (2010) use the
number of carriers offering flights in a certain route as an instrument for example and
Granados et al. (2012) and Mumbower et al. (2014) use how many daily nonstop flights
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in the market being studies that are offered by competitors as an instrument. The fourth
category presented by Mumbower et al. (2014) is measures of non-price characteristics of
other products supplied by firms, the same firm as being studied or others, in the same
market. An example being Berry and Jia (2010) who use the percentage of rival routes
that offer direct flights, the average distance of rival routes and the number of rival routes
as instruments for the price.
The one that is chosen in this paper is a cost shifting instrument that is proposed by
Hsiao and Hansen (2011), namely the length of the route times the jet-fuel price in the
month that is being considered. As the price of jet-fuel affects the costs for airlines, and
the total cost per trip for the airline depends on the distance of the flight, it is likely to be
correlated with the price of the ticket for that flight. Given that this is the case, which of
course is easily tested, the instrument would be relevant (this is also the case in this paper).
In addition, the instrument must fulfill the exclusion restriction, i.e. that it only affects
the number of passengers on a flight through the price, and thereby is not correlated with
the number of passengers in another way, when other covariates are controlled for. When
it comes to the price of jet fuel, this makes sense. It is hard to see how the price of jet fuel
would influence individuals decision to travel abroad. Potentially the jet fuel price could
be correlated with the economic cycle in general, which of course is correlated with how
many people travel abroad, but this can be controlled for through e.g. controlling for the
employment rate or GDP/capita. When it comes to the distance of the journey, it is not
as clear as the length of the journey is strongly correlated with the time it takes to reach
the destination, which incurs a time cost on the passenger that acts as a damper of the
demand for the trip. On the opposite side, destinations further are in general considered
to be more exclusive and can act as a enhancer of the demand. In any case, the distance is
fixed and should therefore affect the variation in demand for specific routes over the time
period that is studied. All in all therefore, it can be argued that this instrument fulfills
the exclusion restriction and that the instrument is valid.
The IV-estimation is conducted in two stages.. The first stage is given by
Ẑgt = ρgt + γIgt + Xgt + ηgt (1)
where Ẑgt is the log of the ticket price per route and month (the monthly average of the
daily price data), Igt is the instrumental variable (the jet-fuel price the given month times
the distance of the route), and Xgt is a vector of control variables including house price
index, employment rate, GDP/capita, temperature in Sweden, and a Google search index
variable for the term “Greta Thunberg”. Time fixed effects are also included. The second
stage is given by
Ygt = θg + δt + βẐgt + Xgt + ugt (2)
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where Ygt is the log of the number of passengers per route and month, Ẑgt is the projected
price variable from the first stage and Xgt is the same vector of control variables that was
used in the first stage. As both ticket price and number of passengers are log transformed,
β can be directly interpreted as the average price elasticity for international air travel from
Sweden, for the routes that are considered, given that the identifying assumptions hold.
4 Data
The main outcome variable is the number of international passengers from Sweden. The
data is quarterly data and for the main analysis the aggregate passenger data on interna-
tional air traveling for different countries will be used. In addition to number of passengers,
data on how the prices of air traveling have developed is also used to examine a potential
effect of the tax on the price of air travel. It consists of country level price indices where
the most weight is put on the most popular routes, so as to most accurately portray the
true average price of air travel. This price index captures all types of air travel, so not just
international travel. The predictor variables that are used are GDP/capita, house price
index, employment rate and the size of the population in the countries. All of these data
sets are publicly available from Eurostat.
The data period that is considered in the main specification for the effect on passenger
numbers starts in the first quarter of 2011, and ends in the last quarter of 2019. The
start of the period is chosen as most of the idiosyncratic shock in international travel
that resulted from the 2008 financial crisis, which affected different countries to a varying
degree, has been recovered by 2011. Given that quarterly data is used, this also gives
plenty of pre-intervention time periods for the SCM to work well, as well as doing tests
of inference (such as in-time placebo checks). The end of the period is chosen as to avoid
any bias from the extreme decline in air travel that inevitably resulted from the covid-19
pandemic. For the effect on the price index, a shorter time period, 2015–2019, is used due
to issues with finding an acceptable pre-fit when longer time periods are used.
For the estimation of the price elasticity of air travel, route-level price data has been
web-scraped from Expedia.com on a daily basis between January 2018 and January 2019.
In order to get a representative price for the destination at a certain date, prices for the
same take-off date was scraped 1 week, 5 weeks and 9 weeks before take-off (except for
the first and last weeks of the web-scraping). One way tickets from Stockholm (Arlanda
airport) to the main airports in Barcelona, Paris, Brussels, Luxembourg, Gran Canaria,
Funchal, Kap Verde, Hurghada, New York, Hong-Kong and Phuket was scraped 1 In
addition to price, the number of stops, total time of the flight and the name of the airline
1In addition, ticket prices for the same destinations but from Helsinki, Copenhagen, Oslo and London
was also scraped but not used at this point in this paper.
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was scraped. Due to data quality issues, only six of these routes could be used in the
estimation, namely Paris, Barcelona, Bryssel, Luxembourg, New York and Hong Kong.
In addition to the predictor variables that are used in the synthetic control group
method, which are used as control variables in the IV-estimation, some other variables
are also included in the IV-estimation. The instrumental variable that is used in the
price elasticity estimation is monthly jet-fuel price data multiplied by the route distance.
The jet-fuel price data is taken from the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) and the
route distances is taken from Google maps. Additional control variables are also included.
The temperature in Sweden is included as a control variable as this variable possibly can
affect both the pricing and demand of air travel, and the data is taken from the European
Climate Assessment & Dataset project. In addition, a proxy variable for the break through
of Greta Thunberg, whose environmental message grew in popularity towards the end of
2018, is used, which is Google trends data for searches on “Greta Thunberg” in Sweden.
5 Main results
One of the advantages with using the synthetic control group is that it is very easy to
get a visual understanding of the estimated effects. In Figure 1 (a) and (c), the devel-
opment of the number of international passengers and price index from Sweden, after
de-seasonalization, is compared with the synthetic counterpart before and after the tax
is implemented (the time period just before the introduction of the tax is indicated with
a vertical line in the graphs). This is the main specification, where the pre-fit does not
include the summer before the tax, as a potential anticipation effect is present in the raw
data, and both Denmark and Finland is part of the donor group.
As can be seen, the synthetic control groups do a good job in mimicking the devel-
opment of international passengers and the price index of air travel before the tax is
implemented, and as soon as the tax is implemented there are clear differences between
the development in Sweden and the synthetic control group, for both the number of in-
ternational passengers and the price index. Figure 1 (b) and (c) show the differences
between the development in Sweden and the development in the respective synthetic con-
trol group, a difference that can be read as an evaluation of how well the pre-fit of the
synthetic control group is made for the time before the tax is implemented and how big the
effects of the tax for the time period after the tax is implemented. The estimated effects
corresponding to the graph are also presented in Table 1, the main specifications, together
with the standardized p-value estimation, which can be interpreted as the probability of
the result happening by pure chance. In the main specification, the tax seems to have an
initial effect of almost 200 000 fewer passengers passengers the first quarter (or a reduction
with 4.4 percent compared to the synthetic control group). The effect then seems to be
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(a) Development of de-seasonalized international
passengers in Sweden and synthetic control group
(b) Effects of tax on deseasonalized passengers
(c) Developement of deseasonalized air travel prices
in Sweden and synthetic control group
(d) Effects of tax on deseasonalized air travel price
index
Figure 1: Effects of the air travel tax on international passengers and price index, de-seasonalized
time series
increasing with time, being the largest in the third quarter the year after where the effect
is around 560 000 fewer passengers (a reduction with about 11 percent compared to the
synthetic control group). The effect on the air price index is sizable at first, being as high
as almost 11 index points (10.4 percent) the second quarter after the tax is implemented,
but after the first three quarters the effect is no longer significant (except for the last
quarter in 2019). Apart from the first quarter in 2019, where the effect seems to be close
to zero, the estimated effect for the remaining quarters is however positive, all though
smaller than the initial effects and only significant in the last quarter of the year. Given
the size of the tax, which is only about 6 Euros for travel within Europe (which is where
most air travel is made from Sweden), these effects are surprisingly large. Especially the
initial large effects on the price index of air travel is much larger than expected, given that
a representative ticket to destinations within Europe costs between 130–270 Euro2. One
potential explanation is that the tax gave the airlines operating in Sweden an opportunity
for increased tacit co-operation on prices, and increased them with more than the amount
of the tax as this is beneficial for all of them given that a price war can be avoided, and
2Based on the web-scraped data used in this paper, for the destinations within Europe.
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Table 1: Quarterly effects of the Swedish aviation tax on passengers and price index of interna-
tional air travel. Standardized P-values below estimated coefficient.
Passengers Passengers Passengers Prices Prices Prices
(main) (full fit) (No FI or DK) (main) (no 2017q2) (No FI or DK)
2018q2 -198175.8 -336091.5 -280979.8 4.077296 4.970327 4.564919
.047619 0 .0526316 0 .0952381 0
2018q3 -355040.8 -440988.8 -563527.3 10.73874 8.388437 10.624
0 0 0 0 .0952381 0
2018q4 -222591.6 -453004.8 -321622.8 7.609439 2.858734 8.189187
.047619 0 .0526316 0 .5238095 0
2019q1 -251717.8 -509518.6 -336985.8 .044559 -1.856733 .41039
.047619 0 .0526316 1 .5238095 .6842105
2019q2 -403750.1 -693316.8 -507440.7 3.488055 .15097 4.259926
.047619 0 .1052632 .1428571 1 .1052632
2019q3 -564845.3 -771135.9 -734069.8 4.23904 1.541584 4.374238
0 0 0 .2380952 .8095238 .2631579
2019q4 -449329.3 -758368.5 -579018.2 5.582713 1.394078 5.356411
0 0 0 .047619 .7619048 0
that this tacit co-operation could only last for a few quarters before the pricing strategies
went back to normal.
To be able to evaluate whether the effect on passengers is reasonable given the price
effects, we first need to estimate the price elasticity of international air travel. These
estimates are found in Table 2, where the price elasticity is first estimated using a basic
OLS-estimation, which is included as a base line comparison even though it is most likely
biased, and then with the IV-estimation, which is the main price elasticity estimate. As can
be seen, the estimated price elasticity from the IV-estimation is -0.758. This means that if
the price of air travel increases with 1 percent, the demand for air travel will decrease with
on average 0.758 percent, on the routes that have been studied. This is slightly lower than
the average estimates in the literature, but as mentioned in the introduction the space of
estimated price elasticities in the literature is very large and differs between countries.
Given the estimated price elasticity, we can also get an indication of how much of
the tax effect that is a pure price effect and how much is due to a symbol effect of the
tax, which is another channel that the tax can have an effect through. For the first three
quarters we see a tax effect on the price index of an increase of 4.3, 10.4 and 8.5 percent
which is accompanied by a reduction in passengers by -4.4, -7.2 and -5.9 percent. Given
the estimated price elasticity and the effect of the tax on the price index, the decrease
14
in passengers are very close to what is expected. For the second year, this is however
not the case, as the price effects are smaller and not significant for most quarters at the
same time as the passenger effects are larger than in the first year. This therefore implies
that there are more than price effects of the tax that are at play for these quarters. A
symbol effect of the tax is one potential explanation for the increased effect of the tax
on passengers the second year after the tax implementation. As the tax was launched
as an environmental tax, at the same time as it got a lot of media attention both before
and after its introduction, it is possible that this attention made, at least some, Swedish
travelers more aware of the environmental damage that air travel has and chose to travel
less because of this. Given that the tax is constant over the period studied, at the same
time as the effects increase, this seems plausible even without the price estimates. It could
however also be that the tax is a result of an already increased environmental awareness,
and that we would have seen a decrease in air travel anyway. Given the timing of the
reduction in air travel, together with the higher than normal air travel the summer before
the introduction of the tax (discussed further below), this is however not as likely. Finally,
there is another potential explanation for the increased effect the second year after the
introduction of the tax: nameley Greta Thunberg. As Greta rose to fame with her pro-
environment message at the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019, it is possible that part
of the relative reduction in air travel in 2019 is due to an increased awareness because of
her. This is however considered further in section 6, where no direct evidence of a “Greta-
effect” is found. Nevertheless, Swedes are in general a climate aware population and the
environmental awareness have likely increased over the past years. Air travel has also
received a lot of focus in the environmental debate, where words such as flygskam (flight
shame) and “stay-on-the-ground” campaigns in social media very likely have affected the
demand for air travel. It is therefore not unlikely that the bigger effect the second year
can be in part explained by this increase in environmental awareness, which might have
been relatively larger than in the countries in the control group.
As the calculation of the p-values that are used for the inference for the tax effect
estimates are a bit different from ordinary regression methods, it is valuable to discuss
these a bit more in depth. These p-values are based on a series of placebo studies where
each potential donor country are considered as the treatment country, instead of Sweden,
and placebo effects are calculated. The actual effect when Sweden is the treatment country
is then compared to these other placebo effects, where one expects the true treatment effect
to be an “outlier” in the sample of estimated effects. The results of these placebo studies
are given in Figure 2, where the difference between the treated and synthetic control
group is presented for all the potential donor countries and Sweden. As can be seen the
actual effect in Sweden is part of the most “extreme” effects in both the passenger and
price estimations, which is what is needed for significant effects. However, the placebo
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Table 2: The price elasticity of Swedish international air travel
VARIABLES First stage OLS-estimation IV-estimation
Ticket price, log-form -0.620*** -0.758***
(0.127) (0.130)
Employment rate 0.871 0.154 0.197
(0.825) (0.387) (0.352)
House price index -0.153 -0.0414 -0.0651
(0.117) (0.206) (0.186)
Greta effect 0.0371 0.00620 0.0102
(0.0275) (0.0639) (0.0577)




Constant -49.35 5.678 6.005
(50.54) (19.09) (17.20)
Seasonal dummys YES YES YES
Observations 75 67 67
R-squared 0.872 0.335 0.321
Robust standard errors within parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
estimation for passengers looks far more neat than the equivalent for prices: in particular,
the pre-treatment fit for the passenger estimation is much more exact than for the price
estimation, where the donor pre-treatment fits are heavily scattered. In the calculated
p-value this is taken into account as the calculated probability is standardized by the
how well the pre-fit in the placebo estimations are. The estimated p-value is thereby an
estimate of the probability that the estimated effect in Sweden happened purely by chance,
where a zero indicates that there is not other country that had as big of an effect when the
pre-treatment fit is accounted for. Hence, even though there seems to be a few countries
that have more “extreme” effects in Figure 2, when the pre-fit is accounted for the Swedish
effect is most “extreme”, or outnumbered only by one of the placebo treatments, for the
quarters that show significant results in Table 1. Even though the p-values correct for how
well the pre-fit is made in the placebo estimations, the volatility of the development in price
indices in all countries warrants some caution in the interpretation of the estimated effects
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of the tax on the price index in Sweden as the underlying volatility in the price indices
increases the risk of the observed effect being a random event. In addition, a lot of pre-
treatment predictor variables of the actual outcome variable, the price index, are needed
to achieve an acceptable pre-treatment fit, as can be seen in Table 4, which increases the
risk of over-fitting. This is not surprising as the price of air travel is notoriously volatile,
but it does also warrant some caution in the interpretation of the the tax effect on the
price level of air travel, both in terms of size and significance.
(a) Placebo estimations of deseasonalized interna-
tional passengers
(b) Placebo estimations of deseasonalized price index
Figure 2: Placebo estimations for other countries to calculate the standardized p-value.
When interpreting these results, it is also important to take into account how well the
variables that are used as predictors are balanced between the treatment group, Sweden,
and the synthetic control group. Ideally we would like to see a perfect balance, that all
used predictor variables are of the same value in the treated and synthetic group, as this
would provide further confidence to the interpretation that the synthetic control group is
comparable to Sweden and that the passenger numbers and prices would have developed
in the exact same way as the control group, had not the Swedish tax been implemented.
As can be seen in Table 3 and 4, this is unfortunately not the case for the predictor
variables that are not the included lags of the variable of interest (passengers or price
index). Average quarterly GDP/capita and employment rate in the used pre-treatment
period is for example higher in Sweden in both the passenger and price estimation. The
balance for the included lags of the main variable of interest are in both cases quite good
however, and it is therefore clear that these are the most important predictors to achieve
the fit that we see in Figure 1. While not ideal, an imperfect predictor variable balance is
only an issue if the variables are really important for the development of the main variable
of interest (passengers and/or price) as well as having a different development in the post-
treatment period compared to the treatment group. If the development of the variables
are the same in the synthetic control group and Sweden, both before and after the tax is
introduced, then this unbalance in the predictor variables is no cause for concern. This
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has been considered, and for all the predictor variables the trend is very similar to Sweden
both before and after the introduction of the tax, as can be seen in Appendix A.3. Hence,
the observed imbalance in the predictor variables should not introduce any significant bias
to the estimated effects.
Table 3: Balance of predictor variables, passenger estimation. Pre-tax averages is only up until
2017q2.
Treated Synthetic
De-seasonalized passengers 2012q1 -171900.8 -183293
De-seasonalized passengers 2012q3 -337606.8 -315415.5
De-seasonalized passengers 2013q3 -98716.75 -126266.7
De-seasonalized passengers 2016q3 276991.3 256209.9
De-seasonalized passengers 2016q4 389663.8 419328
House price index, pre-tax average 89.3812 99.18674
GDP/capita, pre-tax average 11347.23 7704.241
Population, pre-tax average 9653101 1.19e+07
Employment rate, pre-tax average 74.76 65.41955
Ticket price index, pre-tax average 98.914 101.9792
Table 4: Balance of predictor variables, price estimation. Pre-tax averages is only up until 2017q2.
Treated Synthetic
De-seasonalized price index, 2015q3 4.151109 4.258269
De-seasonalized price index, 2015q4 4.806666 5.049587
De-seasonalized price index, 2016q3 -5.335557 -4.549818
De-seasonalized price index, 2017q2 3.063336 2.398287
De-seasonalized price index, 2017q1 -3.683336 -3.668129
De-seasonalized price index, 2017q3 1.184443 1.188242
De-seasonalized price index, 2017q4 -3.59 -2.943606
De-seasonalized price index, 2018q1 -4.47667 -4.008589
Total air passengers, pre-tax average 5389587 1179040
House price index, pre-tax average 108.3015 108.5405
GDP/capita, pre-tax average 11773.35 8147.883
Employment rate, pre-tax average 76.19231 73.83655
Turning back to Figure 1 (a) and (b), there is one particularly interesting observation
to be made in the pre-treatment time period: namely that there seems to be a positive
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effect in the second quarter the year before the tax was introduced. As this “anomaly”
was observed already in the raw-data for Sweden, it is no surprise that it is still present
in the synthetic comparison as the pre-treatment fit was done on the value of the used
predictor variables before this quarter (so as to not inflate the tax effect artificially by
forcing a fit based on this uncharacteristic large number of passengers the summer before
the tax, as described in 3). This is especially interesting as this is the quarter when the
tax was announced, and it might thus be a behavioral effect of either the passengers or
the airlines that we are observing. In both cases the potential behavioral response could
be that it is better to fly more before the tax comes. From the passenger point of view,
they might over-estimate how big the effect on the price will be and figure that it is better
to travel abroad a bit more while it is cheaper to do so. From the airline point of view,
they might maximize the capacity from Sweden compared to for example Denmark while
it is still cheaper to do so, or they might try to exaggerate the tax effect deliberately to
be able to criticize it more effectively. When they then go back to previous levels they
can then point to this reduction in passengers in order to get other forms of subsidies or
compensations from the government. When this quarter is included in the pre-fit, the
results are also higher (as expected) as can be seen in Table 1, but as the SCM does not
allow for the estimation of confidence intervals it might very well be that the difference
could be within this unobservable confidence interval. However, to address this potential
issue more directly the start of the treatment time can also be adjusted and the potential
anticipation effect can thereby be estimated. This is also recommended by Abadie et al.
(2015) when an anticipation effect is suspected, i.e. one should then adjust the start of
the treatment period to when the anticipation effects is assumed to have started. This is
done in section 6, and it is clear that while the third quarter of 2017 is positive the effect
is not significant. This should therefore not be a big issue in the main estimations, but for
reasons of caution we still opt for the most conservative estimate, where the year before
the tax introduction is exempt from the pre-fit, to be used as the main estimation of the
tax effects.
While the results paint a clear picture so far, there are other concerns of potential
biases that need to be addressed. One such bias is the potential for leakage. People living
close to the border to a neighboring country, such as Denmark or Finland, could respond
to the tax by traveling to the closest airport across the border instead of the closest airport
in Sweden, as a result of the tax. While this definitely happened both before and after the
tax was introduced, as some Swedes simply live closer to a Danish or Finish airport and it
is the most convenient option for them, it becomes an issue if people who used to go to the
Swedish airport now go to the airport across the border as a response to the tax. This is
potential bias is especially important to address as both Denmark and Finland are apart
of the synthetic control group in the passenger estimation, and as papers such as Borbely
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(2019) finds evidence of a clear leakage effect to neighboring countries. However, when
an estimation without Denmark and Finland (Norway is already excluded from earlier)
is done, no sign of leakage can be found as the estimated effects are even higher than
in the main estimation. This implies that there has not been any significant leakage to
neighboring countries due to the tax.
6 Robustness checks
In this section, some robustness checks are considered to evaluate the plausibility of the
results. The first check that is considered is a placebo treatment time test; the same
method is used but the treatment time is changed to an earlier date. As no treatment
happened at this time, no effect should be visible. As the data that is used in the original
estimation is deseasonalized using variations up until 2017q2, two different versions of
this robustness check is considered. The first one uses the same data as in the original
estimation, and only changes the treatment time. This tests the validity of the SCM
method on the data that is used in the main estimation. The second one makes a new
deseasonalization using the seasonal variation up until the second quarter of 2014, which is
the chosen placebo time, to deseasonalize the whole series. This instead evaluates whether
the the method of deseasonalization itself introduces any bias in the estimated effects.
Both of these estimations also give further insight into how trustworthy the tax estimates
are; if the difference between the synthetic control group and Sweden after the tax is
driven only by the tax we would expect no similar differences to happen any time between
the placebo treatment time and the actual treatment time, in neither of the alternative
estimations. The results of these two placebo treatment time tests are found in Figure 3.
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(a) Trend comparison, using the same deseasonalized
data as in the main estimation
(b) Effects, using the same deseasonalized data as in
the main estimation
(c) Trend comparison, using data that is deseasonal-
ized only until the new “treatment date”
(d) Effects, using data that is deseasonalized only
until the new “treatment date”
Figure 3: Placebo time estimation with deseasonalized international passenger data calculated
in two ways: one being the same as in the main estimation (i.e. deseasonalized until the actual
treatment date) and one being deseasonalized until the placebo treatment date.
As can be seen, for both of these estimations the synthetic control group tracks Sweden
between 2014 and 2018 almost as well as in the actual estimation. This therefore provide
evidence for that the SCM does a good job in estimating a suitable control group and that
the method of deseasonalization does not introduce any bias. The effect of the the tax, at
the actual treatment time, is also clear in these estimations.
As previously mentioned, there could also be a bias present from a potential antici-
pation effect: that the announcement of the tax, which happened in the second quarter
the year before the actual implementation of the tax, might have resulted in strategic
behaviors by either the airlines or the passengers. The same SCM-procedure is therefore
applied, but where the treatment time is set as the second quarter of 2017 instead of the
second quarter in 2018. As can be seen in Table 5, the first significant effect is however
found the first quarter the tax is actually implemented. The four quarters before the ac-
tual implementation is not significant. While the ocular examination of the development
of international air passengers from Sweden indicates a potential anticipation effect, this
deviation is however not significant. Still, as the there is a clear spike in Sweden the
second quarter the year before the tax it is still good to be careful in choosing the main
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Figure 4: Google search intensity for “Greta Thunberg” in Sweden and the countries that are
part of the synthetic control group in the main specification.
specification in the previous section. Choosing the most conservative estimate, as we do,
is therefore wise.
Another issue worth addressing is the potential Greta effect: since Greta comes from
Sweden and started to spread her message after the tax was introduced (especially the
second tax year could be affected by this), it is possible that this effect has been bigger
in Sweden than in other countries, thereby introducing a biased result. This very hard
to test directly, but one way to gauge the potential differences in effects is to look at
Greta’s popularity in internet searches. In Figure 4 the Google trends statistics for the
search “Greta Thunberg” is presented for Sweden as well as the countries in the (original)
synthetic control group. As can be seen there is no evidence for a larger popularity in
Sweden, and in particular the trends are changing in a similar fashion in all of the countries
that are considered. As the Google trends data is an index relative to the country or region
itself, the numbers are not directly comparable between the countries. However, as the
change are so similar in all of the countries it still provides reassuring evidence for that
the Greta-effect likely is not a big issue in this estimation. At the same time, similarity in
trends in popularity does not ensure that the effects of the popularity is the same in all
countries.
Another way to assess whether Greta has had an increased effect is to estimate the
effect on passenger number using the similar taxes that was introduced in Norway and
Austria, especially as the tax effect in Sweden seems to grow for every quarter after the
tax introduction. If the effects follow a similar pattern, it is less likely that Greta has
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Table 5: Formal examination of a potential anticipation effect from the announcement of the



























introduced any substantial bias in the case of Sweden. These estimations are done in a
similar fashion as in the main specification: the data is deseasonalized and the SCM is
applied using the same donor pool of countries for potential controls as in the main estima-
tion. Sweden is however also included in the donor pool, which is particularly important
to achieve an acceptable pre-fit for Norway, but the time period is restricted to the time
before the tax was introduced in Sweden, to avoid bias at the end of the estimation peri-
ods. As can be seen in Figure 5 , the effects of the tax in these countries look very similar
to the effects in Sweden: the effects seem to be small initially and then increase over time,
just as for Sweden. This provides further evidence against any specific Greta-effect being
responsible for the increased effects over time in Sweden. At the same time it provides
further evidence for that the introduction of the taxes, in all these countries, coincide with
an increased environmental awareness, and that the introduction of an environmentally
motivated tax on air travel provides a strong signal from the government in the respective
country that has effects beyond the price effect. This is especially so as the this type of
pattern can not be solely explained by a price effect, as the tax is constant in all cases.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Effect of Norwegian (a) and Austrian (b) tax on de-seasonalized international air travel
7 Conclusion
In this paper, the effects of the Swedish aviation tax on the passengers numbers and price
index of air travel are estimated using the synthetic control group method. In addition,
the price elasticity of Swedish international air travel is estimated using web-scraped price
data and an instrumental variable approach to account for endogeneity issues. The tax
effect on the number of departing international passengers is big and robust, starting at
a decrease of around 4 percent which then increases to a decrease of around 10 percent.
The tax effect on the price index of international air travel is not as robust, but indicates
an increase in prices the first quarters after the introduction of the tax, the effect being as
much as 10 percent the second quarter after the introduction, which then decreases and
being less significant the second year after the tax. Given the estimated price elasticity
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of -0.76, the estimated price effects can explain the reduction in passengers the first three
quarters. Since the effect on passengers increases as the effect on price decreases for the
last 4 quarters of the period that is being studied, this indicates that there are additional
behavioral effects that are present. One likely candidate is that the introduction of the tax
increased the environmental awareness of the passengers even further through a symbol
effect of the tax. While no direct evidence can be found for a potential “Greta-effect”,
whose rise to fame coincides with the last 4 quarters of the period of study, it is still
also possible that this environmental awareness is fueled even more buy her messages.
In general, the pro-environment messages are strong in Sweden, and have been gaining
more and more traction over the past years, and it is indeed possible that this explains
the increased effects in the second year after the introduction of the tax, especially as
the price effects are reduced after the initial quarters after the tax. Given the timing of
the relative reduction in international air travel, it is however clear that the tax had a
large effect on the demand for air travel, especially as the passenger effects are indeed
very robust and since the potential biases have been addressed. The main take away is
therefore that in the case of Sweden, an aviation tax was very successful in reducing the
number of international passengers. The results from this paper can therefore be used by
policy makers both in Sweden, but also in countries that are similar to Sweden.
While this paper makes an important contribution to the relatively sparse literature
on the effects of aviation taxes, there are still several areas of interest for future research.
Given that there seems to be a behavioral effect in addition to the price effect of the tax,
one interesting research topic is to compare the effects of a newly introduced tax with
the effects of an increase in already existing taxes. Intuitively the effect should be larger
in the initial introduction of a large part of the tax’s effect is due to a symbol effect of
the tax, especially since a newly introduced tax likely gets more media attention than an
increase of an already existing tax. In general, stronger evidence on the symbol versus
price effects of an environmental aviation tax is needed in the literature. In addition, given
that the price effect estimations in this paper are far less robust than the passenger effect
estimation, further research on the effect on prices are also needed. Ideally, one would
have actual price data for at least a year before the introduction of the tax, something
that we did not have in this paper as we only had three months of pre-tax data. Finally,
since the effect of aviation taxes seems to differ between countries it is important to also




Table 6: Countries in the first two tax-zones
(the rest of the countries are in the third tax-zone)

















































A.2 Donor weights in the main tax effect estimations























A.3 Development of predictor variables
In figure 6, the development of the predictor variables in Sweden and countries that are part
of the synthetic control group for the estimation of international passengers are presented.
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(a) Development of GDP/capita in Sweden and syn-
thetic control group countries
(b) Development of employment rate in Sweden and
synthetic control group countries
(c) Development of house prices in Sweden and syn-
thetic control group countries
(d) Development of price of air travel in Sweden and
synthetic control group countries
Figure 6: Examination of developement of predictor variabels in the syntehtic control group
countries in comparison to Sweden.
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